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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

JULIETTE TURLEY,

:

Plaintiff-Appellee,

:

Case No. 970020-CA

vs.

:

Oral Argument
Priority 15

ROBERT WALTERS TURLEY,

:

Defendant-Appellant.

:

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STANDARD OF REVIEW
In her statement of issues presented, Mrs. Turley argues that
a deferential standard of review applies.1

Mrs. Turley states:

"The Appellant's argument that a lessor [sic]

standard applies, is

undercut by the continued reference to the Findings of Fact made by
the Trial Court.11

(Brief of Appellee at 3.)

This betrays an

misunderstanding of the nature of the trial court's decision and
the scope of this appeal.

Mr. Turley's brief does refer to the

findings of the divorce decree, but this appeal does not, and could
not, challenge those findings nor any part of the initial decree.

*Mrs. Turley also includes the statement that "this Court will
not review issues that are raised for the first time on appeal."
(Brief of Appellee at 2.) The statement correctly states the law,
but it is not applicable to this case. Nowhere in her brief does
Mrs. Turley identify any issue which was raised for the first time
on appeal, and there are no such new issues.

At issue here is a post-decree proceeding. The case was decided on
summary judgment, and the trial court therefore did not and could
not make any "findings."
Although an appellate court typically "reviews a trial court's
modification determination for an abuse of discretion," Hill v.
Hill, 841 P.2d 722, 724 (Utah Ct. App. 1992), the trial court's
determination in this case involves solely an interpretation of the
wording of the decree of divorce.

The trial court treated the

issue as having been presented by a motion for summary judgment.
(R. 158.) The only issues presented involve the interpretation of
the decree.

"Since appellate courts are in as good a position as

trial courts to interpret court rulings . . . , [this court] should
review the trial court's interpretation of its order for correctness."

Stevensen v. Goodson, 924 P.2d 339, 346 (Utah 1996).

This rule applies

in divorce matters.

In Bettinaer v.

Bettinger, 793 P.2d 389, 391 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), which was an
appeal from a post-divorce order interpreting the divorce decree,
this Court stated:
A judgment must be enforced as written if
the language is clear and unambiguous. Park
City Utah Corp. v. Ensign Co., 586 P.2d 446,
450 (Utah 1978). However, ambiguous judgments
are subject to the same rules of construction
that apply to all written instruments and "the
entire record may be resorted to for the
purpose of construing the judgment." Id. The
determination of whether a contract is ambiguous is, at the outset, a question of law.
Regional
Sales Agency Inc. v. Reichert,
784
P.2d 1210, 1213 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). "If a
trial court finds the agreement unambiguous
and interprets its meaning by examining only
the words of the agreement, this interpreta-

tion also presents a question of law." Id.
Therefore, we are not required to give the
trial court's interpretation of an unambiguous
judgment any particular weight, but review its
interpretation under a correctness standard.
Id. However, if the trial court determines the
language is ambiguous and finds facts based
upon extrinsic evidence, appellate review of
such findings is limited to determining
whether they are based on substantial,
competent, admissible evidence. 50
West
Broadway Assoc's.
v. Redevelopment
Agency of
Salt Lake City,
784 P.2d 1162, 1171-72 (Utah
1989).
793 P. 2d at 391-92.

Accord

Williams v. Miller, 794 P. 2d 23, 25

(Utah Ct. App. 1990); Whitehouse v. Whitehouse. 790 P.2d 57, 60
(Utah Ct. App. 1990).
Mrs. Turley cites many cases in support of her claim that a
deferential standard of review applies, but none is an appeal from
a trial court's interpretation of its own decree.

Because the

instant appeal challenges the trial court's legal conclusions
reached on summary judgment, review is for correctness, with no
deference to the decision below.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE DIVORCE DECREE DID NOT MANDATE
THAT CHILD SUPPORT BE FOREVER BASED
ON HISTORICAL INCOME.
The divorce decree states that support will continue lfonly so
long as the defendant's income is based upon historical earnings of
$181,000.00 per year." Based on this language, Mrs. Turley argues
that "[t]he plain use of the language, when interpreted in light of
3

the applicable support statutes, is to include the event where Mr.
Turley might actually terminate his employment, but his historical
ability to earn will continue as the basis
obligations."

(Brief of Appellee at 8.)

for his support

Mrs. Turley does not

identify what are "the applicable support statutes," but one such
statute is Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.5(7)(b) (1996).

That statute

provides that potential income, derived from work history and other
factors, should be considered in imputing income for child support
calculations.

Apparently Mrs. Turley stretches this statute in

light of the decree to conclude that child support will be forever
fixed based on Mr. Turley's historical income of $181,000.00 per
year.

There are numerous fallacies with this logic.

First, the language of the decree does not support Mrs.
Turley's interpretation.
effect to each word.

The decree should be interpreted to give

W. & G. Co. v. Redevelopment Agency of Salt

Lake City, 802 P.2d 755, 769 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).

If interpreted

as advocated by Mrs. Turley, there would be no purpose for the
phrase that support should continue "only so long" as income
remained at historical levels. Under Mrs. Turley's interpretation,
there would never be a time at which historical income changed.
A second fallacy in Mrs. Turley's argument is the assumption
that "the applicable support statutes" mandate that income be
imputed at historical levels.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-4 5-7.5 (1996)

states, in pertinent part, as follows:
(6) Gross income includes income imputed
to the parent under Subsection (7).
4

(7) (a) Income may not be imputed to a
parent
unless
the parent stipulates to the
amount imputed or a hearing
is held and a
finding
made that the parent is
voluntarily
unemployed or
underemployed.
(b) If income is imputed to a
parent, the income shall be based upon employment potential and probable earnings as
derived from work history, occupation qualifications, and prevailing earnings for persons
of similar backgrounds in the community.
(Emphasis added.)
Income is not imputed, therefore, until after the court finds,
following a hearing, that the obligor is voluntarily unemployed or
underemployed. Even then, historical income is only one of several
factors which the court is to consider in imputing income.
A third fallacy with Mrs. Turley's interpretation of the
decree is that the subject provision is not dealing with imputed
income. The provision states that support will continue so long as
the income remained at historical levels; it does not say that
income will be imputed at historical levels and therefore support
will forever continue at the same level.
Finally, there is no support for the wild claim that M[a]ny
other interpretation would open the flood gates for obligor parents
to avoid high paying and historical income sources, to intentionally punish and deprive spouses and children."
at 9.)

(Brief of Appellee

The statutory provision quoted above provides a very

adequate hedge against such a possibility.
The trial court in this case did not purport to impute income
to Mr. Turley.

That issue will likely surface on remand, and the
5

trial court will then be required

to hold

a hearing,

receive

evidence, and then determine (a) whether to impute income (i.e., is
Mr. Turley voluntarily unemployed or underemployed) and, if so, (b)
how much income to impute.

Historical earnings is only one of

several factors relevant to that decision.

The decree does not

purport to circumvent this process, and Mrs. Turley's argument to
the contrary should be rejected.
POINT II
THE "CONSTRUE AGAINST THE DRAFTER"
RULE OF CONSTRUCTION DOES NOT APPLY.
Without citation to supporting authority, Mrs. Turley asserts
that "it is black letter law" that any ambiguities in the decree
should be construed
decree.

against Mr. Turley

as the drafter

of

the

Initially, it should be noted that there is no evidence in

the record that Mr. Turley was the sole drafter of the decree.
More importantly, the rule would not apply even if Mr. Turley were
the drafter.

The comments of this Court in Wilburn v. Interstate

Electric, 748 P.2d 582 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), are apropos:
Plaintiff misapprehends the doctrine that
contracts should be construed against the
drafter.
The doctrine does not operate in
dispositive fashion simply because ambiguity
has been found.
Once a contract is deemed
ambiguous, the next order of business is to
admit extrinsic evidence to aid in interpretation of the contract.
It is only after
extrinsic evidence is considered and the court
is still uncertain as to the intention of the
parties that ambiguities should be construed
against the drafter.
In other words, the
doctrine of construing ambiguities in a contract against the drafter functions as a kind
of tie-breaker, used as a last resort by the
6

fact-finder after the receipt and consideration of all pertinent extrinsic evidence has
left unresolved what the parties actually
intended. This rule has been summarized as
follows:
After applying all of the ordinary processes of interpretation, including all
existing
usages,
general,
local,
technical, trade, and the custom and
agreement of the two parties with each
other, having admitted in evidence and
duly weighed all the relevant circumstances and communications between the
parties, there may still be doubt as to
the meaning that should be given and made
effective by the court.
If . . . the
remaining doubt as to the proper interpretation is merely as to which of two
possible and reasonable meanings should
be adopted, the court will adopt that one
which is less favorable in its legal
effect to the party who chose the words.
3 A. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts
748 P.2d at 585-86 (footnotes omitted).

§ 559 (1960).
This is consistent with

the rule that the interpretation of an instrument

should be

determined first from the four corners of instrument, then from
contemporary
construction,

writings,
and

then

finally

through
from

application

parol

of

extrinsic

rules of
evidence.

Continental Bank & Trust Co. v. Bvbee. 6 Utah 2d 98, 306 P.2d 773,
775 (1957).
If the decree in this case were ambiguous, the remedy would
not be to construe it against the drafter, but rather to resolve
the ambiguity by reference to other contemporanous writings.

The

most reliable extrinsic evidence would be the Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law. Such an approach was employed in Whitehouse v.
Whitehouse. 790 P.2d 57, 60 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
7

Faced in that

case with a "very unusual and perhaps even inequitable division in
the equity of the family home," the court looked at the decree and
the supporting findings and conclusions to determine the meaning of
the decree.
Paragraph 7 of the Findings in the instant case resolves any
ambiguity which may exist in the Decree.

The findings state that

it is reasonable for support to continue at the decree level "in
the event [Mr. Turley7s] income does not terminate."

The obvious

corollary is that the support was not intended to continue at the
same level if Mr. Turley was unable to find income at the historical level.
CONCLUSION
This Court should review the interpretation of the divorce
decree for correctness, without deference to the decision below.
The correct interpretation, consistent with the findings of fact,
is that the decree contemplated that levels of support in the
decree would continue only if Mr. Turley were able to obtain income
at the historical level of income.

Mr. Turley's petition for

modification alleges he was not able to maintain that level of
income. The trial court's judgment of dismissal should be reversed
and the case remanded for trial on Mr. Turley's petition.
DATED this

2~/^

day of July, 1997.

LESLIE W. SLAUGH, for:
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN<
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant
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